Quantum-Resistant Encryption - Why It Matters and How to be Prepared
Your current encryption will be breakable. Here's what you need to know and do about it — from someone who's built payment systems handling real money.
Your current encryption will be breakable. Here's what you need to know and do about it — from someone who's built payment systems handling real money.

Here's the uncomfortable truth: most of the encryption protecting your data today will be worthless once quantum computers mature.
I spent years doing penetration testing before moving into product. Security isn't abstract to me — I've seen what happens when encryption fails. And the quantum threat isn't science fiction anymore. It's a timeline problem.
This is what keeps security people up at night.
Nation-states and sophisticated attackers are already capturing encrypted traffic and storing it. They can't read it today. But when quantum computers can break RSA and ECC (and they will), all that stored data becomes readable.
If your system handles:
...then data encrypted today could be exposed in 10-15 years. For some data, that matters a lot.
To be clear: no quantum computer has broken real-world encryption yet. What we have is Shor's algorithm (1994) which mathematically proves that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could solve the problems underlying certain encryption schemes efficiently.
Theoretically vulnerable (via Shor's algorithm):
These haven't been broken in practice. The largest number factored by a quantum computer is tiny (a few digits). But the mathematical vulnerability exists, which is why the industry is preparing.
Believed to remain secure:
The concern is asymmetric cryptography — the math that lets two parties establish a secure connection without pre-shared secrets. That's what may break.
NIST finalized their post-quantum standards in 2024. Here's what you need to know:
CRYSTALS-Kyber (now ML-KEM) — For key exchange. This is what will replace Diffie-Hellman and RSA key exchange. Already being deployed in Chrome, Cloudflare, and Signal.
CRYSTALS-Dilithium (now ML-DSA) — For digital signatures. Replaces RSA and ECDSA signatures.
SPHINCS+ (now SLH-DSA) — Hash-based signatures. Larger but based on very conservative assumptions.
These are based on mathematical problems (lattices, hashes) that quantum computers can't efficiently solve. At least, not with any known algorithms.
1. Inventory your cryptography You probably don't know everywhere you use RSA or ECC. It's in your TLS certificates, your JWT signing, your database encryption, your API authentication. Map it.
2. Prioritize by data lifetime Ask: "If this data were decrypted in 15 years, would it matter?"
3. Start with hybrid approaches Don't rip out RSA today. Use hybrid encryption that combines classical + post-quantum. If the PQ algorithm has an unknown weakness, you're still protected by RSA. If RSA breaks, you're protected by PQ.
Cloudflare and Google are already doing this in production.
4. Watch your dependencies Most of your crypto comes from libraries (OpenSSL, libsodium, etc.). Track when they add PQ support. Plan your upgrade path.
5. Budget for larger keys and signatures Post-quantum algorithms have bigger keys and signatures. Kyber public keys are ~1.5KB vs 256 bytes for ECC. This affects:
Not huge, but not zero either.
Nobody knows when — or if — quantum computers will break current encryption. Here's my conservative estimate:
The honest answer is: we don't know. Quantum computing has been "10 years away" for decades. It could be 2035. It could be 2060. It could hit a fundamental physics wall.
But "harvest now, decrypt later" means attackers are betting on the eventual breakthrough. For data that needs to stay secret for 20+ years, that's worth considering.
Bottom line: If you're building systems that handle sensitive data with long lifetimes, post-quantum cryptography should be on your roadmap. Not panic-mode urgent, but definitely "start planning now" urgent.
The transition will be messy — like every major crypto transition. But it's coming whether you're ready or not.